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CASE COMMENTS
CONTRACTS: CAVEAT EMPTOR IN REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS
Davis v. Dunn, 58 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1952)
Plaintiffs purchased defendants' house after being informed by
defendants' broker that the house was in sound condition and that
previous inspections showed no signs of termites. They paid part cash
and executed a purchase money mortgage for the remainder of the
purchase price. Four months after taking possession plaintiffs discovered that the house was heavily infested with termites and thereupon brought suit to rescind the sale and to cancel the mortgage on
the ground of fraud. Defendants counterclaimed to foreclose the mortgage. Denying the recommendations of the special master that the
sale be rescinded because of false representation as to material facts,"
the circuit court found for defendants and entered a decree foreclosing
the mortgage. On appeal, HELD, plaintiffs, having had full and ample
opportunity to inspect the premises, had no right of reliance. Decree
affirmed.
It has generally been held that a material misrepresentation of
fact as to the quality or condition of real property furnishes an
equitable ground for rescission.2 This result follows even though
the vendor believed it to be true and did not knowingly make the
misrepresentation3 There is no right of reliance, however, when the
misrepresentation is not a statement of fact but rather a mere qualitative expression of opinion, belief, or expectation. 4 Nevertheless, if
the opinion is stated as an affirmation of fact, that is, in a positive
'At pp. 540, 541 the special master's findings of fact are substantially set out.
2Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26 (U.S. 1839); Rawlins v. Myers, 96 Neb. 819, 148
N.W. 915 (1914); 2 BLACK, RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN
INSTRUMENTS §425 (2d ed. 1929).
aSmith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26, 36 (U.S. 1839); Peace River Phosphate Mining
Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 370, 135 So. 828 (1931); Jones v. Hardesty, Inc., 100 Fla. 155,
129 So. 497 (1930); Langley v. Irons Land and Devel. Co., 94 Fla. 1010, 114 So.
769 (1927). But see 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §888 (5th ed. 1941).
4E.g., Johansson v. Stephanson, 154 U.S. 625 (1877); Glass v. Craig, 83 Fla. 408,
91 So. 332 (1922); Hart v. Marbury, 82 Fla. 317, 90 So. 173 (1921); Stackpole v.
Hancock, 40 Fla. 362, 24 So. 914 (1898); 3 POMEROY, EQuiTr JURISPRUDENCE §878
(5th ed. 1941); 29 MICH. L. REv. 1099 (1931). Expert opinions may be treated
otherwise. See Harper and McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation,
22 MINN. L. Rxv. 939, 952 (1938).
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manner, the courts generally will construe the representation as one
5
of fact, not opinion.
Furthermore, it is well settled that even when the representation
is one of fact the purchaser is under a duty to use ordinary care and
diligence in ascertaining the truth of the representation;6 thus clearly
there is no right of reliance when the purchaser undertakes an independent examination,7 or if he is an experienced person in the field
of the misrepresentation,8 or if the misrepresented defect is patent to
any ordinary observer., The cases nevertheless are in confusion as
to when this duty to use ordinary care and diligence requires an inspection on the part of the purchaser. In Williams v. McFadden0
the Florida Court held that an inspection was necessary even though
inconvenient and unreasonable, requiring the purchaser to come to
Florida from Kentucky to examine the property involved in order
to determine the truth of the vendor's representations. This holding
early established the view that the doctrine of caveat emptor was applicable to transactions involving realty. Later cases indicate that
the duty of inspection exists only when sufficient opportunity is given
the purchaser to inspect." Even with this apparently rigid background,
however, the Florida Court in Morris v. Ingraffial held that the
mere opportunity of inspection was not sufficient to make inspection
a prerequisite to rescission.
The Court in the instant case apparently interprets the broker's
representation as one of opinion rather than fact, for in its extensively
quoted authority, Greenberg v. Berger," a representation as to the
maximum OPA rental price on an apartment house was held to be
mere opinion. Unquestionably statements concerning the stability
5Willis v. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 136 So. 358 (1931); 3 PoME~oY, EQuITy Juass§878 (5th ed. 1941); 29 MicH. L. Rav. 1099 (1931).
6Pepple v. Rogers, 104 Fla. 462, 140 So. 205 (1932); Hancoy Holding Co. v.
Lambright, 101 Fla. 128, 133 So. 631 (1931); Langley v. Irons Land & Devel. Co.,
supra note 3; Hirschman v. Hodges, 59 Fla. 517, 51 So. 550 (1910).
7Hancoy Holding Co. v. Lambright, 101 Fla. 128, 133 So. 631 (1931).
sFote v. Reitano, 46 So.2d 891 (Fla. 1950).
9McDonald v. Rose, 50 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1951); 3 POMmOY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE
§894 (5th ed. 1941).
1023 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618 (1887).
I"Hancoy Holding Co. v. Lambright, supra note 7; Hirschman v. Hodges, supra
note 6.
12154 Fla. 432, 18 So.2d 1 (1944) (purchaser not required to inspect public
records on options).
1346 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1950).
PRUDENCE
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of the peanut market 4 or the value of real estate 5 are matters of
opinion and generally cannot be relied upon no matter how expressed;' 6 yet, considering the positive manner in which the statement
of the absence of termites was made, the implication of the Court that
it was an opinion is questionable.
Assuming that the Court found the statement to be opinion, no
consideration of the duty of inspection would have been necessary,
because the right of reliance would have been immediately cut off.'Despite this questionable implication the Court considered it the
duty of the plaintiffs to use reasonable care and diligence, indicating
a finding that the representation was a statement of fact, and held that,
since the purchaser was not denied the right of inspection, he had no
right of reliance. By assuming from the Court's findings of fact that
a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the presence of termites' 8
the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of caveat emptor in real estate
transactions.
The easoning is in direct conflict with the increasing trend
toward the doctrine of justifiable reliance.' 9 Recognition of this doctrine in Florida would minimize the making of careless representations
as to the quality or condition of property involved in real estate transactions. Under the present law a purchaser, to protect himself, either
should require an express warranty within the deed or should make a
thorough and complete investigation into the matter in question.
RicHARD W. REEVES

14Hart v. Marbury, 82 Fla. 317, 90 So. 173 (1921).
"Glass v. Craig, 83 Fla. 408, 91 So. 332 (1922).
16See note 4 supra.
17Ibid.

'8At p. 541. This is questionable, since the special master found that only
by breaking the stucco on the outside or the plaster on the inside could the presence
of termites be ascertained. Cf. Blackman v. Howes, 82 Cal. App.2d 275, 185 P.2d
1019 (1947) (filled lot); Welch v. Reeves, 142 Neb. 171, 5 N.W.2d 275 (1942)
(covered floor joists).
'DSee PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §749 (1941); Harper and
McNeely, supra note 4.
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